生态经济

碳生态补偿是实现“双碳”目标的核心政策工具，但在跨区域协同中面临主体博弈困境与制度落地瓶颈。论文基于政府行为视角，构建包含上级政府的三方演化博弈模型，通过建立收益矩阵、求解复制动态方程及稳定性条件，识别博弈均衡解与关键影响因素，并利用数值仿真验证参数敏感性，最终提出破解该困境的优化路径。研究结果表明：(1)三方协同参与碳生态补偿的稳定性高度依赖上级政府监管意愿，当上级政府主动监管时，下级政府无论初始意愿如何均会积极参与；反之则难以自发形成合作。(2)降本增效是推进三方协同参与碳生态补偿的核心驱动力，且三方对支出型参数(成本、惩罚)的敏感度显著高于收入型参数(补偿额、奖励)，降低参与成本与强化上级政府惩罚约束更有利于碳盈余/碳赤字政府参与碳生态补偿。(3)上级政府的惩罚效应优于奖励效应，尤其对碳盈余政府的威慑力显著强于碳赤字政府，建议对前者实施“阶梯式惩罚与声誉约束”机制，强化对碳盈余方的履约保障。本研究可为破解政府间碳生态补偿博弈困境，促进其有效落地实施提供理论支撑。

Carbon ecological compensation is a core policy tool for achieving the dual carbon goals,but its cross-regional coordination faces challenges in terms of stakeholder conflicts and institutional implementation bottlenecks.This study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving higher-level governments from the perspective of government behavior.It establishes a payoff matrix,solves replication dynamic equations and stability conditions,identifies game equilibrium solutions and key influencing factors,and uses numerical simulation to verify parameter sensitivity in order to propose an optimized path to break the deadlock.Research results show:(1) The stability of tripartite collaboration in carbon offsetting is highly dependent on the regulatory intentions of higher-level governments.Proactive regulation can encourage lower-level governments to actively participate regardless of their initial intentions,whereas the absence of such regulation makes spontaneous cooperation difficult.(2) Cost reduction and efficiency improvement are the core drivers of tripartite collaboration,and the three parties are significantly more sensitive to expenditure-related parameters (costs,penalties) than income-related parameters (compensation amounts,rewards).Reducing participation costs and strengthening upper-level penalty constraints are more conducive to the participation of governments with carbon surpluses/deficits.(3) The deterrent effect of penalties is more effective than that of rewards.The deterrent effect on governments with carbon surpluses is significantly stronger than that on governments with carbon deficits.It is recommended to implement a “tiered penalty and reputation constraint” mechanism for the former,strengthening compliance safeguards for carbon surplus parties.This study provides theoretical support for resolving the dilemma of intergovernmental carbon ecological compensation negotiations and promoting their effective implementation.